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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of political risk on financial performance. In order to assess 
the quantitative measure of political risk principal component analysis is performed referring 
to six indicators, which measure different areas of political environment. We employ several 
macroeconomic factors as control variables to strenghten the explanatory power of estimation.  
Panel data methods are used to test the impact of political risk. It turns out that political risk is 
not priced in equity returns, while results are sensitive to the time span changes. We show that 
the impact on price-to-earnings ratio is negative and statistically significant implying that 
investors are willing to pay less for stocks with higher risk. Dividend yields respond 
positively, but the regression has weak explanatory power. Among macroeconomic variables, 
GDP turns to have a significant influence on all the financial performance measures. 
Additionally, the effects of unemployment, exchange rate movements, interest rates and 
reserves on returns are statistically significant. To conclude, the paper demonstrates the 
existence of the impact of political risk proxies and various macroeconomic indicators on 
equity market performance. 
Keywords: political risk, stock market, returns, price-to-earnings ratio, dividend yield, 
macroeconomic factors, panel regression 
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1 Introduction    
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of political environment on main financial 
indicators. We investigate whether political risk is a priced factor affecting investors’ 
perceptions and sentiments or it is diversifiable and has no impact on stock markets.  
The main motivation for our research is that political events are closely linked to economic 
development. They shape economic environment, change financial risk and can even trigger 
financial crises. Therefore, it is likely that political movements are reflected in stock prices. 
Consequently, political risk should be taken into account in financial decision-making and the 
link between political situation and equity market performance is worthwhile investigating.  
Political risk is defined as a risk of investors’ losses or decrease in firms’ profitability due to 
political events, government actions or inactions. For instance, Howell and Chaddick (1994) 
describe political risk as a possibility that political events or circumstances in a given country 
will affect the business environment in such a way that investors will lose money or reduce 
marginal profits.  The fundamental financial concept is that in equilibrium equity prices 
should be equal to discounted projected cash flows. Introducing political risk increases the 
range of possible cash flows as well as discount rates. Consequently, the volatility of returns 
surges, while returns can either decrease reflecting poor firms’ performance or increase due to 
investors’ demand for a higher risk premium. The concept of market efficiency implies that 
stock prices reflect all available information including the risk related to political fluctuations. 
The impact of political news depends on investors’ perceptions: if the new information leads 
to an upward revision of investors’ expectations, the equity prices should increase and vice 
versa.  On the contrary, globalization makes political risk more diversifiable wiping out the 
risk premium related to political ambiguity.  
Some of the pioneers in exploring the linkage between politics and economics are Nordhaus 
(1975) and Alesina (1987). Their theoretical political business cycles framework suggests that 
the popularity of politicians depends on the macroeconomic conditions; thus, the optimal 
macroeconomic policy is determined by the election cycle. Moser (2007) found that political 
uncertainty emanating from upcoming elections significantly increased bond spreads in Latin 
American countries in the sample period from 1992 to 2007. Döpke and Pierdzioch (2006) 
propose to examine stock market performance instead of macroeconomic variables since 
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equity prices are in the focus of media coverage related to economic news. Belo, Gala and Li 
(2013) conclude that during Democratic presidencies U.S. firms with high government 
exposure tend to have larger returns, while the opposite situation arises during Republican 
presidencies. Ramcharran (2003) uses panel data of 21 countries to examine the effect of 
economic and political risk on returns, price-to-earnings ratios (P/E), dividend yields (DY) 
and price-to-book ratios. The author claims that political risk indicator is positively related to 
stock returns, while economic risk negatively affects dividend yields.  Ultimately, political 
risk affects economic and financial performance as well as managerial decisions regarding 
dividends.  
One of the biggest issues is that political risk is unobservable and hard to measure; therefore, 
a reliable proxy is required. Previous research papers suggest several ways to deal with this 
problem. Some of the studies concentrate on the uncertainty arising from political events such 
as elections, change of cabinets as well as external and internal conflicts. Another way is to 
employ indices of political uncertainty provided by financial agencies and research 
organizations. In this paper we use the World Governance Indicators (WGI) estimated by the 
World Bank, which measure six areas of political riskiness on a yearly basis. Yearly 
frequency of the data constitutes the major limitation of the paper since returns are examined 
in shorter time intervals. However, this issue should not impact the quality of estimations due 
to the nature of political risk: political environment tends to alter gradually making the 
monthly variation in risk measures too small to capture possible effects.  Influential political 
events are rare, for instance, elections take place once in a few years. Furthermore, WGI allow 
us to test six separate areas of political stability and increase the number of observations. A 
large dataset comprising of 17 periods and 39 cross-sectional units reinforces the reliability of 
results. 
The objective of the paper is to explore the impact of both political risk and macroeconomic 
factors on stock market performance using panel data technics. We calculate the aggregate 
political risk indicator by principal component analysis. We start with pooled regressions and 
then fixed and random effects are introduced. In order to check the validity of our results, we 
test the significance of initial risk measures and check the sensitivity of results to the 
exclusion and inclusion of separate variables as well as to changes in time boundaries. 
To introduce our research findings briefly, political risk has significant negative impact on 
price-to-earnings ratio demonstrating that investors are willing to pay less for riskier stocks 
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and do care about political situation in a given country. The influence on dividend yield is 
positive and also significant. However, it turns out that returns are not determined by political 
risk proxies. Among macroeconomic factors five out of six indicators are statistically 
significant in the regression on returns, namely: GDP per capita, exchange rate movements, 
interest rates, reserves and unemployment changes.  
Our contribution to existing papers is threefold. Firstly, we include into our estimations a 
large number of countries varying in terms of economic and political development, while 
most of prior research applies the analysis on one or few countries. Secondly, contrary to 
many previous papers we take into account macroeconomic factors, which might have 
influence on returns. Omitting significant variables leads to biased and inconsistent 
coefficients. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of regressions and the validity of 
results, we have to find relevant determinants of stock market movements.  In turn, the 
relationship between macroeconomic and financial performance is widely explored by 
researchers but usually separately from a political risk paradigm. Thirdly, in comparison to 
previous studies we use a longer time span ranging from 1997 to 2013. 
The remainder of the paper contains five parts structured in the following way. Chapter two 
presents the theoretical background of political risk in a relation to financial markets as well 
as an investigation of previous studies. Chapter three describes methodology, data collection 
and description of applied variables. Chapter four presents and discusses the main findings of 
the empirical analysis. Finally, Chapter five checks the robustness of estimations and Chapter 
six concludes with a brief discussion of the results. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
The objective of Chapter two is to discuss fundamental issues related to political risk. Firstly, 
we examine numerous papers and reports to highlight the importance of political risk concept 
in financial decisions. Secondly, we look through a variety of methods to measure political 
risk; discuss their advantages and flaws to build a reliable model. We provide a detailed 
description of six indicators used in our estimations. Finally, we summarize the major 
findings of previous empirical studies classifying them by the methods of estimation and 
political risk proxies.  
2.1 The Concept of Political risk 
In most of financial articles and glossaries political risk is defined as a risk of operating or 
investing in a country, where political changes, decisions or disruptions might lead to losses. 
Suleman (2013) describes major sources of political risk. For the wide list of emerging 
markets political ambiguity emanated from the collapse of communism and execution of 
market-oriented or democratic reforms. Political risk arises from uncertainty corresponding to 
the exercise of political power, governmental decisions and their consequences. In addition, 
non-governmental actors can trigger political events and alter prevalent business conditions. 
Research and risk organisations provide with analyses scrutinizing the importance of political 
risk.   Results of the survey annually conducted by the World Bank Group in Figure 1 show 
that investors are concerned with political risks, especially with regulatory changes and the 
breach of contract.  
Figure 1: Political risks which are of most concern to investors  
(developing countries, percent of survey respondents). Source: World Investment and Political Risk 
2013, World Bank Group.  
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Adverse regulatory changes
Breach of contract
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Civil Disturbance
Non-honoring of financial obligations
Expropriation
Terrorism
War
next 12 months
next 3 years
  
11 
In equilibrium, stock prices should be equal to discounted values of future expected cash 
flows or dividends, while the discount rate reflects the required rate of return. Political 
uncertainty makes the range of possible cash flows and discount rates wider and, thereby, 
increase the volatility of returns. The impact on returns itself is unclear and requires special 
attention. If political risk is diversifiable, investors would not require a significant risk 
premium. Equity prices should increase if the new information about political situation causes 
an upward revision of investors’ expectations and vice versa (Tan and Gannon (2002)). 
Suleman (2013) finds out that political risk tends to lower equity returns for emerging 
countries due to decrease in cash flows. The influence of political risk on P/E multiple and 
dividend yield is not widely explored in research papers, most of articles focus on returns and 
their volatility.  
2.2 Political Risk Measures 
Political risk is unobservable and hard to quantify. All methods to proxy political risk can be 
broadly categorized into two approaches. The first one basically links political risk to 
uncertainty arising from specific events such as elections, change of cabinets, external and 
internal conflicts. Technically, this approach can be performed by constructing dummy 
variables corresponding to these events. Some studies (e.g. Beaulieu, Cosset, and Essaddam 
(2005)) argue that stock market promptly reacts on news floats regarding political changes. In 
addition, Suleman (2012) finds out that terrorist attacks make stock returns lower and 
volatility higher with a significant leverage effect.  
Durnev (2010) claims that the information about elections is exogenous variable, which is 
well-distributed across countries and time; thereby, it can create a powerful dataset 
appropriate for estimations. Exogeneity, possibility to build up the data for every country on 
monthly or daily basis are the major advantages for the dummy variables approach. However, 
for some countries binary variables might serve a poor proxy not reflecting real political 
riskiness. In addition, using this method for countries with dissimilar political and economic 
development might lead to biased results since the impact of the same event might vary to a 
large extent across the countries.  
The second method implements quantitative measures estimated by rating agencies, financial 
and research organizations. They provide with political risk country-related information on 
mainly semi-annual and annual basis. These indicators incorporate quantitative (e.g., 
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unemployment or military expenditures) and qualitative data (e.g. the presence of internal or 
external conflict). Some other indicators relate political stability to democracy measures since 
it is widely accepted that non-democratic countries are more exposed to political imbalances.  
One of the widely used indices is International Country Risk Guide calculated by PRS Group. 
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) examine various political risk scores using portfolio and 
cross-sectional approaches and conclude that only ICRG composite index (the aggregation of 
political, economic and financial risk scores) significantly explains stock returns. This index 
is calculated on a monthly basis for 140 countries since 1984. Political risk index consists of 
12 weighted variables: Government stability, Socio-economic conditions, Investment profile, 
Internal conflict, External conflict, Corruption, Military in politics, Religious tensions, Law 
and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability, Bureaucracy quality. Since the 
access to ICRG database is limited, we have to find another proxy. 
Integrated approach was proposed by Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011). Authors construct 
the index based on statistics about most influential international political crises during the 
period 1918-2006. The main limitation of modelling rare disasters is that the dataset is limited 
since such events happen once in approximately 10-15 years. Therefore, modelling 
assumptions should include the perceived probability of a disaster rather than historical 
probability.  
In order to examine the response of stock markets on political risk we use World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) provided by the World Bank Group. These indicators are calculated on a 
yearly basis for the period 1996-2013 measuring different aspects of political development; 
their detailed description is presented in the Table 1 below. We use WGI in order to account 
for different angles of political environment and increase the number of countries used in 
estimations. The yearly frequency of the data constitutes a considerable limitation of the paper 
since returns largely vary in short time intervals (i.e. monthly or daily). However, due to the 
nature of political risk, yearly indicators should not significantly constraint the validity of the 
results. Political changes are long-term (e.g. elections happen once in few years), thus, the 
monthly variation in political risk estimations might be too small to capture possible effects. 
 
 
 
  
13 
Table 1: Indicators of political risk  
The table contains a brief description of six political risk indicators, which we use in the 
analysis. Each indicator is measured in units of a standard normal distribution ranging 
approximately from -2.5 to 2.5. Source: The World Bank Group 
WGI Description 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence or 
Terrorism 
Perceptions of the probability that the government will be destabilized or liquidated 
by violent or unconstitutional means such as terrorism and politically motivated 
violence. 
Control of corruption Estimate of the extent to which public power is used for private gains. The measure 
includes both small and large forms of corruption, and the degree of state’s 
“takeover” by elite groups and private interests.  
Government 
effectiveness 
Perceptions of the quality of public and civil services, their exposure to political 
pressures, the quality of formulation and implementation, the governmental 
commitment to policies and procedures.  
Regulatory quality Measure of the government’s ability to formulate and implement reliable policies 
and regulations. 
Rule of Law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in law and follow the 
rules of society. In particular, it measures the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
Voice and 
Accountability 
Estimate of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in elections and in 
selecting of the government, estimate of the freedom of expression and association 
as well as the media.  
 
Summarizing, it is challenging to find a representative and unbiased proxy due to the several 
reasons. Firstly, a solid indicator should be forward-looking and appropriate for forecasting, 
while many influential political events are unpredictable. Secondly, endogeneity problem 
might arise since many indices incorporate information about social development and 
macroeconomic factors, which can be interrelated with stock market performance. Finally, 
although political events such as elections are exogenous, they might be of different 
importance across the countries. Thus, they might have low explanatory power in cross-
sectional or panel regressions with the large number of countries included. 
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2.3 Previous Research 
Political environment is an important part of economic decisions. From the late 1980 till now 
researchers develop theoretical and empirical models in order to take the political component 
into account. Political country-related risk can hardly be measured precisely; therefore, there 
is a need for a reliable approach.  
According to their purposes, prior studies can be broadly divided into two domains. One part 
of researchers explores the impact of political risk and events on the performance measures of 
individual firms. For instance, Beaulieu et al. (2005) investigate the effect of political news on 
volatility of stock returns in Canada using GARCH regressions. They show that investors do 
not require a risk premium since political risk does not have a significant impact on returns 
and can be diversified away. However, political uncertainty increases the riskiness of 
investments measured by the volatility of stock returns. Girard and Omran (2007) develop a 
multifactor extension to Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which takes into account not 
only standard firm specific measures, such as market-to-book value, firm size and industry, 
but also country-related risk scores proxied by ICRG indices. Durnev (2010) uses a panel of 
47808 firms to scrutinize the influence of elections on the stock-price sensitivity. He 
concludes that investment is 40% less sensitive to stock prices during election years compared 
to non-election periods. Besides, elections are the source of uncertainty, which in turn leads to 
drop in post-election returns.  
Other researches focus on country level indicators and they can be categorized according to 
econometric technics. Most common approaches are GARCH framework, time-series 
regressions and panel data methods. For example, Cermeño and Suleman (2014) use 
asymmetric GARCH for four Latin American countries, and report that political risk is priced 
in stock markets having a positive influence on returns. The effect on volatility is significant 
and asymmetric; political aggravation tends to have higher impact on volatility than 
improvements in political conditions.  Diamonte, Liew and Stevens (1996) propose that 
political risk has larger influence on stock returns in emerging markets than in developed 
ones. Authors also point out that last few years political risk has a decreasing trend in 
developing counties and, conversely, tends to increase in developed ones. Authors make an 
assumption that if this tendency continues, the difference in political risk would narrow in 
future. 
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Many papers examine one or several countries performance using time-series regressions. Lin 
and Wang (2004) use dummies for legislative assemblies and power changes as proxies for 
political risk. They reveal that Taiwan stock market returns and volatility are not significantly 
determined by legislative assembly effect, while power changes are negatively related to 
mean returns and positively to volatility. As pointed out by Mei and Guo (2004), political risk 
measured by elections dummy variables has predictive power on financial crisis. Döpke and 
Pierdzioch (2004) find no evidence that German stock market returns are higher during liberal 
than during conservative governments and claim that there is no evidence of the election cycle 
in German stock market returns. The link between political news and stock returns is 
investigated by Soultanaeva (2008) in the case of three Baltic countries. The author argues 
that political news decreases the volatility in Tallinn and Riga and the significant spillovers 
effects from Russian news can be observed. 
Panel dataset allows to substantially increase the number of observations. Ramcharran (2003) 
uses returns, price-to-equity ratios, dividend yields and price-to-book ratios as dependent 
variables for the panel of 21 countries. He concludes that political risk has significant and 
positive influence on stock returns and price-to-book ratio, while dividend yield is explained 
by economic risk measure. According to Suleman (2013), political risk is priced in both 
emerging and developed markets, while its influence in emerging markets is stronger. Perotti 
and Oijen (2001) estimate panel datasets of 22 emerging countries, which experienced 
privatization periods and find that privatization increases political riskiness, while political 
risk is a priced factor in almost all regressions.  
The detailed classification of previous research papers can be found in the Appendix Table 
A1. Summarizing existing studies, most of them claim that political risk has significant effect 
on the volatility of stock returns with the leverage effect, while results related to equity 
returns are controversial. Political risk is of special concern in case of developing countries, 
which are generally less stable and have larger cross-sectional and period variation of political 
risk measures as well as in economic conditions. In current study, we expect political risk to 
be a significant factor in explaining stock market performance. 
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3 Data and Methodology 
Chapter three describes the methods applied in this paper. It commences with a description of 
data collection: the set of variables, sources and transformations. The choice of the variables 
is supplemented by the short review of existing empirical research devoted to macroeconomic 
determinants of stock market performance. Then, the section presents the panel sample: 
countries and the time intervals. Finally, it specifies the regression model and describes 
reliability tests aimed to ensure the validity of estimations.  
3.1 Data Description 
The set of variables required to analyse the impact of political risk on financial performance 
can be divided into three groups: dependent variables, political risk measures and control 
variables. The main sources of data collection are Datastream and the World Bank Group, 
which provide with standardized country-level information. In the following subchapters we 
describe the motivation of variables selection, necessary transformations to the raw data and 
hypotheses about the signs of corresponding coefficients. Table A2 in the Appendix 
summarizes the set of variables and presents the description and sources of each variable used 
in our dataset.  
3.1.1 Dependent variables 
The choice of dependent variables is proposed by Ramcharran (2003): returns, dividend 
yields and price-to-earnings ratios are scrutinized. Logarithmic returns (R) are based on dollar 
local indices for each country in order to mitigate the effect of currency 
depreciation/appreciation that greatly affected equity prices, especially in 1990s. Campbell, 
Lo and MacKinlay (1997) point out that continuously compound returns are additive; thus, 
they are more suitable for time-series modelling.  
Returns and their volatility are in the focus of research related to political risk. Almost no 
studies apply P/E and DY as dependent variables. However, Afza and Tahir (2012) argue that 
price-to-earnings ratio is the measure widely used in valuation models and which most fund 
managers, investors and market analysts take into account in the decision-making. P/E 
multiple shows how much investors are willing to pay for a unit of firms earnings and thereby 
reflects investors sentiments and confidence. Shamsuddin and Hillier (2004) show that P/E 
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ratio in Australia could be explained by macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, 
exchange rate and interest rates.  
Dividend policy of the company is usually explored as an indicator of managers’ decisions in 
relation to firm specific variables such as leverage, growth opportunities, profitability and 
size. We do not include these variables since they are firm-related. This delimitation keeps the 
interpretation of regressions similar and comparable. Political risk is the fundamental factor, 
which shapes the economic environment, influences possible cash flows and the availability 
of debt and thereby it is likely to have an impact on the aggregate dividend yield based on 
local indices. Dividend yield is a relative indicator representing the ratio of a dividend per 
share to price per share. Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficients depends on results for 
regressions on returns and the assumptions about the influence on equity prices. If equity 
prices are not determined by political risk, then the positive coefficient for DY would mean 
that companies tend to increase dividend payments or initiate new dividends when facing 
risky circumstances and vice versa in the case of negative coefficient. If we find out the 
existence of a political risk premium, a negative coefficient would mean that the dividends 
either decrease in the level of political risk or their increase is smaller than a simultaneous 
increase in share prices. Given the fact that companies might be conservative in dividend 
decisions, we consider the latter case logical and consistent with basic economic 
considerations.  
3.1.2 Political risk measures 
The variables of interest are six political risk indicators as well as principal components 
extracted from them. To simplify the interpretation we rewrote the original scores with the 
opposite sign, what means that high positive values of them indicate notable political riskiness 
and vice versa. Thus, all the indicators increase in the level of political risk. Each estimate 
gives a value measured in units of a standard normal distribution ranging approximately from 
-2.5 to 2.5.  
We expect political risk to have a positive influence on returns, implying that investors should 
require a risk premium for an increased level of uncertainty. If political risk is diversifiable, it 
would not influence investors’ behaviour making the coefficient insignificant. However, 
assuming that generally investors prefer to invest in domestic equities, political risk is 
unlikely to be entirely diversifiable. Moreover, we expect negative influence of political risk 
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measures on price-to-earnings ratio since investors agree to pay less for stocks with increased 
level of risk. The influence on dividend yield is controversial and is not well studied in 
research papers in relation to political risks. Hence, we do not specify a precise hypothesis. 
For instance, Ramcharran (2003) receives negative significant effect. Huang, Wu and Zhang 
(2015) examine firms’ payout policy under different levels of political uncertainty and 
conclude that traditional dividend payers are likely to terminate or reduce dividends and 
historical non-payers are willing to initiate dividends facing periods of high political 
ambiguity.  
3.1.3 Control Variables 
A number of factors are considered to analyse stock market performance. While the vast 
majority of previous papers do not use control variables (e.g., Ramcharran (2003), Suleman 
(2013), Lin and Wang (2004)); we expect that including macroeconomic indicators would 
strengthen the quality of estimation. Moreover, the influence of these factors constitutes a 
focus of many research papers. Therefore, they are also a point of interest in this study. The 
variables we collected are the integration of standard control factors used in previous research 
papers. Furthermore, by using control variables we account for different economic conditions 
across developing and developed markets. From statistical perspective, omitting relevant 
variables has substantial adverse consequences: coefficients become biased and inconsistent, 
which might lead to the wrong inference (i.e. type I error). Conversely, including irrelevant 
variables increases the chance of type II error because of overestimated standard errors. 
Various researches found significance relationship between returns and macroeconomic 
performance. Therefore, we consider that control variables strengthen the reliability and 
accuracy of the results.  
The set of control variables consists of: the first difference of logarithmic GDP per capita 
(D_GDP), the first difference of unemployment rate (D_U), inflation rate (INFL), interest rate 
(IR), the first difference of logarithmic exchange rate (ER), total reserves in a ratio to GDP 
(TR), money supply in logarithmic first difference (M2), and foreign direct investment in a 
ratio to GDP (FDI). Data sources are DataStream and the World Bank Group. Detailed 
descriptions of each variable construction as well as all the sources are shown in the 
Appendix Table A2. In line with Tangjiprom (2012), the variables can be divided into four 
domains. First group consists of factors representing general economic conditions: GDP and 
unemployment.  The second one reflects price level, which is represented by inflation rate. 
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Next group contains variables that reflect the Central Bank policy, namely: interest rate and 
money supply. Finally, foreign direct investments, reserves and exchange rate cover 
international activities. This classification is commonly used; however, it should be treated 
with accuracy. For instance, in few cases when exchange rate is targeted by the Central Bank, 
it represents monetary policy rather than international activities.  
GDP per capita and unemployment are most fundamental variables reflecting country’s 
performance, which are widely used in economic and finance literature. Hess (2003) explores 
the relationship between stock price and macroeconomic factors at Swiss stock market, and 
finds out that the output variable is a significant factor explaining stock prices. Another proxy 
for economic conditions is employment rate (or oppositely, unemployment rate). Rjoub, 
Türsoy and Günsel (2009) investigate the impact of macroeconomic factors for Istanbul stock 
market and find out that unemployment rate has positive effect on portfolio returns, but the 
overall results have weak explanatory power (low R-squared). Singh, Mehta and Varsha, 
(2011) explore the cointegration relationships between macroeconomic variables and stock 
returns in Taiwan. They reveal that employment rate is insignificant, whereas GDP is 
significant determinant of returns. We expect positive coefficient for GDP movements since 
stock prices usually go in the same direction with economic cycle. We assume unemployment   
to be negatively related to returns since high unemployment reflects bad economic conditions.  
Humpe and Macmillan (2009) examine relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
stock market movements in US and Japan. They reveal negative influence of inflation on US 
real stock prices through unexpected changes in the price level.  Since we use dollar-based 
indices, inflation measured by an annual change in customers’ prices would cause 
deterioration of dollar-based equity prices resulting in negative influence on returns. 
Interest rates and money supply are traditional instruments used by the Central Bank. Humpe 
and Macmillan (2009) find that US T-Bond yield and Disco (official discount rate in Japan) 
are negatively related to stock market returns. Classic asset pricing concept implies that stock 
prices should be equal to expected discounted cash flows; hence, we presume negative 
relationship between interest rates and returns. Chancharat, Valadkhani and Havie (2007) use 
money supply (M2) to study the impact of macroeconomic factors on stock returns in 
Thailand and found no influence of money supply on stock returns. We use M2 aggregate in 
the first difference of logarithms in order to check if changes in monetary policy are reflected 
in stock prices. Theoretically, the effect of money supply might be controversial, but since 
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Central Bank increases money supply to boost economic growth, we expect positive 
coefficient in returns regressions.  
Next group of variables represents international activities in a given country. Singh et al. 
(2011) discover a significantly positive relationship between exchange rate and stock prices 
for Taiwan. Since we use dollar-based returns and an increase in exchange rate measure 
means devaluation of local currency, we expect negative influence of exchange rate 
movements on dollar-based returns. In line with Mei and Guo (2004), we include the variable 
related to reserves position of the country: total reserves (including gold) as a ratio to GDP in 
current US$. Ray (2012) finds positive significant effect of foreign currency reserves on stock 
returns. Reserves are used to keep the local currency stable and facilitate debt repayment; 
hence, they have stabilizing influence on economic conditions. Consequently, we assume 
them to be positively related to returns. Foreign direct investments reflect the quality of 
financial system in a given country and can make valuable contributions to the host country's 
economic growth and development. Adam and Tweneboah (2008) investigate the effects of 
foreign direct investments in Ghana and find them positively related to the stock price 
movements.  
Table 2: The summary of control variables 
The table puts together all the control variables used in estimations and presents expected 
signs of the coefficients for regression on returns based on both theoretical considerations 
and results of prior empirical studies.  
 Variables Hypothesis:  
effect on returns 
General macroeconomic 
conditions 
GDP per capita [first difference of logarithms] + 
Unemployment [first difference] - 
Price level Inflation rate [consumer price index] - 
Monetary policy Interest rate [deposit rate] - 
Money supply [first difference of logarithms] + 
International activities Foreign direct investments [ratio to GDP] + 
International reserves [ratio to GDP] + 
Exchange rate to USD [first difference of logarithms] - 
 
We suppose that applying control variables would enhance the overall explanatory power of 
regressions and increase R-squared. Inclusion of irrelevant variables leads to inefficient 
estimators and inflates standard errors, while omission of significant factors causes biases and 
inconsistency. Therefore, we check the robustness of the results by running regressions with 
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different sets of control variables and run standard tests of joint redundancy for insignificant 
factors. The detailed exploration of regression sensitivity to the variables composition is 
provided in Chapter 5.1.  
3.2 Sample 
Time dimension contains 17 years of data for 39 countries ranging from 1997 to 2013. The 
panel dataset is unbalanced and consists of 662 observations (658 in case of P/E).  The 
number of observations is large enough to get robust estimations and the inclusion of both 
developing and developed countries to the main sample gives more variation in political risk 
values. According to IMF classification, the sample consists of 23 developing countries and 
16 developed ones. 
The sample of developing countries includes: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Poland, Russian 
Federation, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, RB Egypt, Arab Rep., China, Ecuador, 
Kenya, and South Africa. The sample of developed countries encompasses:  Australia, 
Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
The main motivation for countries selection is the data availability, especially in case of 
developing countries, for which many observations were missing. For developed markets we 
mainly use countries that experienced significant political risk changes across the time. For 
example, Slovak Republic, Estonia and Slovenia have long history of one-party rule and only 
recently have been transformed to democratic government system. Greece and Spain have 
faced political turbulences. Greece highly suffered from economic crisis and Spain 
experienced uncertainty due to Catalonia possible separation. Some other countries such as 
Austria, Germany and United Kingdom are examples of stable low risky countries. Therefore, 
our overall sample seems to be representative and appropriate for estimation.  
Including only one group of countries, either developing or developed ones, might lead to 
incorrect results due to lower variation in political risk measures as well as in returns. 
Moreover, since we take yearly data for quite long period of time, the one can notice that 
large groups of countries experienced the same conditions and changes, which might lead to 
some clustering. For example, the crisis of 1998 was noticeable in Russian Federation and 
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many post-soviet countries or Asian crisis of 1997-1998 stroked large numbers of countries 
from out sample. To build up a representative sample, we have to embrace countries from 
different regions with substantial variations in macroeconomic and political conditions.   
However, it might be the case that developing and developed countries respond differently to 
political risk as well as to macroeconomic factors or the response to political risk can appear 
significant only in developing markets. In line with many previous studies, we test these 
hypotheses using dummy variables approach. The regression, estimation output and 
discussions are presented in Chapter 5.4.  
3.3 Estimation Methods 
Since six initial indicators of political risk are highly pairwise correlated, we are not able to 
use all of them in a sole regression. The interpretation also becomes complicated in case of 
many measures of political risk. In order to reduce the number of factors, we use principal 
component analysis and extract three first principal components (PC) for political riskiness.  
Mathematically, principal components estimation is orthogonal linear transformation of initial 
variables by finding the linear combination of them, which accounts for the largest proportion 
of their variation. We solve the following maximization problem: 
max𝑥 𝑥′?̂?𝑥       𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑥′𝑥 = 1                                                                                      (1)                                                                     
where ?̂? is the 6x6 correlation or covariance matrix for risk indices.  
According to Jolliffe (2002), correlation is normalized variable, which is less sensitive to 
difference in measurement scales of separate indicators. Therefore, we employ correlation 
matrix instead of covariance one. Solving the equation (1) we obtain 6x1 eigen vector x for 
the first principal component (PC1). For the sequent principal components we impose 
additional orthogonality restrictions. According to Field (2009), the number of factors to 
retain depends on correlation matrix and eigenvalues of each factor. Furthermore, the 
correlation coefficients between PC and initial indicators have to be high and positive in order 
for PC to have a meaningful interpretation. We estimate first three principal components and 
base our decision on these considerations. The estimation and the analysis of PC are shown in 
the Appendix Table A3. While principal component analysis seems to provide with reliable 
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estimations in our case, we test the validity of the results by running regressions on individual 
risk indicators.  
The paper implements a panel regression, which allows combining the information both 
cross-sectionally and across the time and hence, makes the data more generalizable and 
informative, provides with more degrees of freedom, less collinearity and higher efficiency 
(Brooks (2008)).  The main regression, where all the explanatory variables are included looks 
as the following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑_𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2𝑖𝑡 +
           +𝛽8𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (2) 
Equation (2) can be generalized as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑍𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                  (3) 
In equations (2) and (3) t=1, 2,…, 17 denotes the time period (i.e. year) and i=1, 2,…, 39 
denotes the cross-sectional unit (i.e. country); 𝑦𝑖𝑡  indicates the dependent variable (i.e. 
returns, DY or P/E), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 represents the error terms. Z is the set of explanatory variables 
including risk measures, 𝛽 is the matrix of coefficients, Coefficients α and 𝛽 are assumed to 
be constant both across time and countries.  
Firstly, by treating the data as a bigger cross-section, pooled ordinary least squares 
regressions were run to explore the impact of political risk and macroeconomic factors on R, 
DY and P/E. Pooled regression assumes no heterogeneity both in time and in cross-sectional 
dimensions. 
According to Hsiao (2006), the widely used approach in the panel data framework is to 
assume that the effects of observed explanatory variables are identical for cross-sectional (CS) 
units and over time, and the effect of omitted variables can be decomposed into time and CS 
specific effects (𝛾𝑖, 𝜂𝑡 correspondingly):   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜶 + 𝑍𝜷 + 𝜸𝒊 + 𝜼𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 (4) 
In order to test whether the regression is subject to heterogeneity arisen due to country-
specific or time-specific reasons we introduce fixed effects and test them for joint 
significance. Fixed effects model for cross-sectional dimension (time dimension) allows the 
intercept to change across countries (time) but not across time (countries). Therefore, 
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mathematically it is equivalent to introducing dummy variables to each cross-sectional unit 
(time period). Random effects model also allows intercepts to vary periodically or cross-
sectionally, but the opposite to fixed effects, random effects model treats 𝛾𝑖, 𝜂𝑡 as the part of 
error term.   
Brooks (2008) points out that random effects are usually more efficient when the sample is 
randomly taken from the population, while fixed effects are suitable when the sample 
represents the entire population. While random effects model is generally more efficient, 
fixed effects assumptions are less strict (random effects require the “new error term” to have 
zero mean, constant variance and to be independent of all explanatory variables). While 
ordinary least squares are applied for fixed effects model, random effects require generalized 
least squares estimator. Our choice between two types of models is based on Hausman test, 
which checks if the assumptions on the error terms under random effects model are valid.  
Major disadvantage of fixed effects model is that it is not parsimonious in terms of degrees of 
freedom since it is equivalent to adding dummy variables to each cross-sectional or time unit. 
The number of degrees of freedom is equal to N-k, where N is the sample size and k is the 
number of independent variables. Therefore, degrees of freedom decrease due to introduction 
of new variables, t-statistics get higher, and the probability of not rejecting the “wrong” null 
hypothesis increases (i.e. type II error becomes more probable). The common method to deal 
with this problem is so-called within estimator. Within estimator produces the same 
coefficients estimates but with the higher degrees of freedom compare to LSDV, since the 
model contains fewer variables. Mathematically, within estimator is done by running 
regressions with demeaned variables: time-mean of observations is subtracted in case of 
cross-sectional fixed effects and the means across the countries at a single point of time are 
used for period effects.  
Heteroscedasticity problem influences standard errors and therefore, might lead to the wrong 
inference. White standard errors are larger than ones estimated by OLS, and make hypothesis 
tests more conservative (the probability of type II error increases). We perform Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test for heteroscedasticity and use White’s standard errors if necessary. 
For conducting BPG test residuals are squared and then regressed on explanatory variables: 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑘                                                                                                  (5)  
where ?̂?𝑡 are residuals from the regression and 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘 are k explanatory variables.  
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After estimating the equation (5) 𝜒2 test or F-test for joint significance of coefficients can be 
performed. If the null hypothesis of joint insignificance (i.e. homoscedasticity) is rejected, 
then we should account for heteroscedasticity in the model.  
Finalizing, the exact specification of the model depends on formal tests for effects 
significance and properties of the model. In order to verify the statistical quality of 
estimations, we perform series of robustness checks running regressions with different time 
spans and varying the set of explanatory variables. If the results are different from those for 
the main specification, further considerations are needed.  
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4 Results 
This Chapter presents main findings based on the estimation of panel regressions for the 
whole dataset consisting in 39 countries and 17 periods. All the explanatory variables are used 
in regressions and principal component analysis is conducted in order to obtain a political risk 
proxy. Only “the best fit model” is shown in this section. Intermediate estimations and 
specification tests can be found in the Appendix (Tables A6-A8). Before the estimation we 
carry data analysis by examining descriptive statistics and correlation matrices, transform 
variables and adjust for outliers if necessary.  
4.1 Principal Components  
The estimation of first three principal components is provided in the Appendix A3.  As the 
first step, eigenvalues (i.e. maximum value of the matrix 𝑥′?̂?𝑥 from the optimization problem) 
and eigenvectors (i.e. vector x, the factor loadings) were calculated. Then, multiplying the 
loadings with the original risk indicators, we obtained the actual values of principal 
components. The proportion of variance explained determines “the quality” of PC by 
measuring the amount of information it captures from all original factors:  
 
𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝑃𝐶]
∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖]
6
𝑖=1
                                                                                                  (6) 
The first look at the Table 3 shows that only PC1 obtains the information from original 
indicators accounting for more than 88% of common variance, while all other indicators 
explain only tiny part of it (less than 5%). The difference in eigenvalues is also large. Field 
(2009) points out that, in general, factor loadings greater than 0.3 are considered important, 
while for the large sample size (more than 600 observations as in our case) loadings should be 
greater than 0.21. Factor loadings are shown in the Appendix Table A3. This “rule of thumb” 
is totally consistent with PC1, but not with PC2 and PC3. Moreover, both PC2 and PC3 
contain even negative factor loadings, which mean that they are negatively related to 
corresponding original indicator as shown in the Table 4.  From the Table 4 we can see that 
only PC1 is highly positively correlated with original indicators. 
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Table 3: Eigenvalues for Principal Components 
The table presents main properties of first three principal components, which show how much 
information from original indicators is carried out by each PC. 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Eigenvalues 5.301 0.283 0.229 
Proportion of the variance explained 0.884 0.047 0.038 
 
Table 4: Correlation coefficients of PC with original political risk indicators 
The table shows the correlation coefficients between each PC and original indicators, 
namely: (1) Political Stability; (2) Control of Corruption; (3) Government Effectiveness; (4) 
Regulatory Quality; (5) Rule of Law; (6) Voice and Accountability. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PC1  0.88 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.89 
PC2  0.30 -0.24 -0.24 -0.17 -0.19 0.19 
PC3  -0.36 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 0.30 
 
We conclude that PC2 and PC3 are redundant and do not represent the true behaviour of 
political risk. This result is consistent with the fact that we had to deal with six highly 
positively correlated original indicators (the minimum pairwise correlation is 0.79). As the 
result, the first PC is already powerful and can be used as a sole proxy for political risk 
notably facilitating the interpretations.  For further analysis only PC1 is applied.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics and general trends 
The descriptive statistics presented in the Appendix Table A4 is provided after an adjustment 
made for a sole outlier. Observations related to Bulgaria in 1997 were excluded since the 
country faced large economic turbulences such as inflation exceeded 1000%.   
The summary statistics for all the risk measures is shown in the Appendix A4 Panel C. Risk 
measures have negative mean and median and hence non-zero skewness implying that the 
sample might be slightly biased towards stable countries.  Principal component shows larger 
minimum-maximum gap resulting in higher standard deviation approximately twice as big as 
the one for separate risk indicators. Hence, in comparison with WGI, PC might carry more 
country- or time-specific information and thereby might have better explanatory power. 
Nevertheless, we test all the indicators for significance in the series of robustness tests 
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provided in Chapter 5.2. Information about the properties of control variables is presented in 
the Appendix Table A4 Panel B. Macroeconomic variables show relatively good properties, 
mean-median gaps are quite small, witnessing the absence of severe outliers’ impact. Despite 
of all the transformations involved, skewness and kurtosis are far from those for the normal 
distribution. Appendix Table A4 Panel A contains the summary statistics for dependent 
variables. Returns show high maximum and low minimum, but these values are considered as 
not outlying. Indeed, they lay in much less number of standard deviations from mean-median 
than those observations omitted for Bulgaria. P/E ratio contained few extreme values and after 
removing them, the properties of distribution improved significantly (e.g., the kurtosis 
decreased from 345 to 10).  
Summarizing, decisions regarding outliers require special attention. On the one hand, 
removing observations wipes out country- or time-specific characteristics, but on the other 
hand, few extreme values might obscure the whole sample leading to wrong inferences. For 
the data comparability, all the variables were transformed to ratios or logarithmic differences. 
However, they still do not seem normally distributed. The further differencing complicates the 
interpretation of the model, while panel dataset usually provides with sufficiently large 
number of observations (662 and 658 in our main dataset), which asymptotically improve the 
sample properties. 
Correlation matrix for explanatory variables is shown in Appendix Table A5 (Panel A). 
According to the general “rule of thumb”, the near multicollinearity problem might arise if the 
variables experience pairwise correlation coefficients greater than 0.8 in absolute terms 
(Brooks (2008)). Since the highest correlation coefficient is 0.73, we do not face severe 
multicollinearity problems to be adjusted for. Panel B of the Appendix A5 shows correlations 
between dependent and explanatory variables as a preliminary data analysis. Though 
correlation does not assume the direction of dependency, the signs show general linear 
linkage between the variables and should be compared with the signs of estimated 
coefficients. In our case, the correlations with returns have expected signs: negative for P/E 
and positive for PC, though the latter has a small value of 0.02. The correlation coefficient for 
DY is positive. All the signs of correlation coefficients for control variables are in line with 
our hypotheses related to returns. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 represent time averaged and country averaged behaviour of PC and 
returns.  Returns and political risks are not clearly co-moving, however, some common 
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patterns can be seen. For instance, Venezuela has the highest average return and the highest 
political risk averaged for the last three years. In case of significant coefficients, we also 
estimate regressions omitting Venezuela in order to make sure that the sole country does not 
obscure the whole sample. Developed countries such as Netherlands, Australia and Austria 
have relatively low returns and ones of the lowest risk values. Country-averaged political risk 
tends to increase in time, having a peak in 2009 after financial crisis (with the corresponding 
drop in returns). It is worth noticing that the overall increase in political riskiness was caused 
mainly due to Russian Federation, Egypt and Slovenia. Though Slovenia is politically stable 
with relatively low political risk scores for each year of observation, the average yearly 
change in risk reaches +0.10, and it constitutes one of the largest increase for the whole 
sample. 
Figure 2: Time-averaged returns (three last years) and principal component 
 
Figure 3: Country-averaged returns and principal component 
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Figure 3 shows a controversial point to consider: during the world financial crisis in 2008-
2009 the link between returns and political risk became reversed. While political risk 
increases reaching the local peak, returns drop to the lowest point of the entire time span. 
Since the main hypothesis is that returns and political risk are positively related, this strong 
reversed movement is likely to influence estimation results. Therefore, in the robustness 
section we check the significance of political risk explaining returns on various time intervals 
with included and excluded observations related to crises. Another econometric method to 
deal with this problem is to introduce the corresponding dummy variables, but it is 
inappropriate in case of period fixed effects since dummies for each year are already included 
in specification.   
Due to clear country-averaged peaks in returns, that are shown in the Figure 3, we expect 
period effects to be significant, while time-averaged returns might be well explained by 
political risk indicator and control variables, which are likely to capture country-related 
variations. However, we test all the possible combinations of fixed and random effects and 
base the final decision on corresponding significance tests.  
4.3 Estimation results 
Pooled ordinary least squares regressions were initially estimated in order to check the 
influence of political risk and macroeconomic indicators on all the dependent variables. The 
output tables are provided in the Appendix Table A6. Regression run on returns depicts a 
decent R-squared, which equals to 0.28. The coefficient for political risk is statistically 
insignificant and has the negative value. Moreover, coefficients for interest rate and reserves 
also obtained unexpected signs. GDP, unemployment and exchange rate changes are highly 
significant on 1% level with predicted signs.  Regressions on both P/E and DY have quite low 
R-squared less than 0.10, but political risk is significant at 1% level. Among the control 
variables only GDP has an explanatory power.  
In order to test whether the dataset is biased by heterogeneity, fixed effects were introduced 
and tested for significance. If fixed effects (i.e. dummy variables for cross-sectional units or 
periods) are jointly significant, then the data suffers from heterogeneity problems and pooled 
regressions are misspecified. The next step is to test whether random or fixed effects should 
be used to capture the heterogeneity. All estimation outputs for specification tests are shown 
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in the Appendix Table A7. Random effects usually are preferable since they correct the model 
by just as much as needed by transforming the data precisely to ensure that there is no cross-
sectional (or period) correlation between the error terms. But in the same time random effects 
have stricter assumptions, which can be checked by running Hausman test. As we can see 
from the Appendix Table A7, the regression on returns contains heterogeneity only in period 
dimension and fixed effects should be used. In the regressions run on P/E and DY we should 
account for heterogeneity in both dimensions. The specification tests conclude that random 
effects are misspecified for P/E equation; hence, two-ways fixed effects are introduced. For 
DY we cannot reject zero hypotheses that cross-sectional random effects are well specified, 
but we reject it for period dimension. Summarizing, both ways fixed effects should be used 
for regressions on P/E multiple and random-fixed effect combo – for those on DY.  
The next step is to ensure that residuals are homoscedastistic. Estimation outputs for 
regressions on squared residuals are shown in the Appendix Table A8.  We reject zero 
hypothesis about homoscedasticity for returns and do not reject it for P/E and DY. To correct 
the bias in standard errors caused by heteroscedasticity, White’s period covariance method is 
applied.  We rely on BPG test, but we should notice that not rejecting the null hypothesis does 
not verify us with the homoscedastic residuals: we just know that residuals are not linearly 
proportional to explanatory variables, while other forms of heteroscedasticity might exist.  
However, the form of dependency tested by BPG test is the most common and usually the test 
gives reliable results.  
Finalizing, the most suitable specifications are provided in the Table 5. We show R-squared 
for both methods of estimation – within estimator and LSDV model. The latter is substantially 
higher due to inclusion of dummy variables. Within estimator is used in order to save degrees 
of freedom. 
All F-statistics approve the joint significance of independent variables. R-squared is decent 
for regressions on returns; however, the coefficient turns to be very low in case of DY, 
suggesting that only tiny part of dividend yield’s variation can be explained by our set of 
variables. In DY regression after applying LSDV method to both ways fixed effects, R-
squared artificially raises to 0.3523 (0.2840 if to adjust for the number of variables). 
Moreover, coefficients for M2 and ER turn significant but only on 10% level. We provide 
estimations both for two-ways fixed effects and fixed-random effects combination. The 
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choice between them might be intricate, but it does not affect our main interpretations: the 
coefficient of political risk is significant in both specifications.  
Table 5: The summary of results 
The table illustrates final regressions with principal component as a political risk proxy and 
macroeconomic indicators as additional explanatory variables. Standard errors are in 
brackets.  *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. White Period 
Standard errors were used for returns regression to account for heteroscedasticity. Method of 
estimation: Panel Least Squares and Panel GLS for DY with RE.   
Dependent variable R P/E DY DY 
Effects 
Specification 
Period FE  
(within) 
Period FE 
(LSDV) 
CS FE  (within) 
Period FE 
(LSDV) 
CS RE  
Period FE 
(LSDV) 
CS FE (within) 
PC1 
0.0037 
[0.0070] 
 
-0.0334*** 
[0.0107] 
0.0021** 
[0.0010] 
0.0110*** 
[0.0031] 
 
INFL 
-0.4086 
[0.3654] 
 
0.0122 
[0.0525] 
-0.0018 
[0.0149] 
-0.0097 
[0.0151] 
IR 
0.4964* 
[0.2743] 
 
0.0957 
[0.0840] 
0.0023 
[0.0218] 
-0.0029 
[0.0241] 
ER 
-0.3107*** 
[0.1112] 
 
-0.0337 
[0.0262] 
0.0117 
[0.0076] 
0.0133* 
[0.0075] 
D_GDP 
2.3099*** 
[0.6742] 
 
0.2856*** 
[0.1316] 
-0.0825** 
[0.0372] 
-0.0623* 
[0.0377] 
D_U 
-3.0780*** 
[0.8745] 
 
-0.4283 
[0.2969] 
-0.1096 
[0.0846] 
-0.1179 
[0.0093] 
FDI 
0.2184 
[0.1851] 
 
0.1328* 
[0.0716] 
0.0122 
[0.0228] 
0.0214 
[0.0230] 
M2 
0.1672 
[0.1547] 
 
-0.0120 
[0.0802] 
-0.0139 
[0.0093] 
-0.0178* 
[0.0093] 
TR 
-0.1752* 
[0.1004] 
 
-0.1139** 
[0.0562] 
-0.0076 
[0.0133] 
0.0113 
[0.0160] 
R-squared 0.1484 0.1357 0.0286 0.1576 
R-squared (LSDV) 0.4845 0.2142 N.A. 0.3522 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0250 0.0000 
No. of observations 662 658 662 662 
 
Based on the obtained results, the first principal component was significant for price-to-
earnings ratio and dividend yield on at least 5% significance level. The sign of the coefficient 
in case of P/E ratio is negative as predicted approving that investors are willing to pay less for 
the unit of firms’ earnings with an increased level of risk. Positive coefficient for returns gives 
a sign that political risk is the factor, which is priced and investing in countries experiencing 
more ambiguous political situation generates higher returns. However, the coefficient for PC 
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in regressions on returns is not statistically significant even on 10% level. This result is in 
contrary to many of prior studies, but in line with Beaulieu et al. (2005), who claimed that 
investors do not require a risk premium for political risk.  The sign of the coefficient in the 
regression on dividend yields is in contrast to Ramcharran (2003) since in our sample political 
risk and DY are positively related.  
The influence of macroeconomic factors is summarized in the Table 6. Changes in GDP per 
capita, unemployment and exchange rate have statistically significant impact on returns with 
economically logical signs. Devaluation of the local currency leads to decrease in dollar 
returns. Returns co-move with economic cycle reflected by GDP changes, which means they 
increase in booms, while drop in recessions. Unemployment reflects general macroeconomic 
situation, the raise in this indicator significantly lowers returns and vice versa. The actual 
signs of the coefficients for interest rates and total reserves are not expectable and require 
special attention. They might be caused by few outlying countries, where the relationship was 
reversed due to specific macroeconomic turbulences.  
Table 6: Expected and actual impact of macroeconomic factors on returns 
This table compares the hypotheses from the section 3.1.3 and actual results we obtained. The 
right column shows the signs of the correlation coefficients from Appendix Table A5. Only 
signs of significant estimates are shown.  
Area Variables Expected effect Actual effect Correlation 
sign 
General 
macroeconomic 
conditions 
GDP per capita  + + + 
Unemployment  - - - 
Price level Inflation rate - Not significant - 
Monetary policy 
Interest rate - + - 
Money supply  + Not significant + 
International 
activities 
Foreign direct investments + Not significant + 
Reserves  + - + 
Exchange rate to USD  - - - 
 
As for P/E regression, GDP, FDI and reserves obtained significant coefficients at 1%, 10% 
and 5% level, respectively. GDP and P/E multiple are positively related, which means that 
during booms investors are willing to pay more for the same stocks and equity prices tend to 
be overestimated. In the opposite, during recessions, investors are less optimistic resulting in 
lower price for the unit of firms’ earnings. Net inflows of FDI also positively impact P/E, 
while the effect of reserves is negative. Dividend yields negatively react on GDP movements 
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and do not respond to any other macroeconomic factors. Since dividend yield is calculated as 
the dividend per share divided by price per share, this result is the combined effect of political 
risk on share prices and on dividend payments. As we do not have an evidence that political 
risk is reflected in equity prices, this outcome means that companies generally tend to 
increase dividend payments facing periods of high political riskiness and vice versa. 
However, managerial decisions regarding dividends initiation or omissions should be 
investigated on companies’ level with higher frequency data, which provides with more 
reliable results.  
Summarizing the section, we find evidence that political risk does impact financial indicators 
such as price-to-earnings ratios and dividend yields. Therefore, investors care about the 
political performance in a given country, even though they do not require a significant risk 
premium.  With financial globalization and integration reinforced during last several years, 
investors obtained wide possibilities to diversify their portfolios. These processes tend to wipe 
out the premium related to political risk. Not less important result is that macroeconomic 
factors have significant explanatory power on financial performance measures.  In the 
following chapter we present series of robustness checks, which are aimed to prove the 
reliability of our estimations.   
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5 Robustness testing 
In Chapter five we present a set of robustness checks that verify the quality of our 
estimations. We test the plausibility of coefficients obtained from regression on returns. 
Firstly, we control if estimations are sensitive to separate variables inclusion or exclusion as 
well as to periodic changes in the sample. We test variables for redundancy and run 
regressions on different time intervals. Then we check whether the results for principal 
component differ from those for separate indicators of political risk. Finally, we explore 
plausible differences of political risk effects between developed and developing countries. 
These specification checks do not find the evidence of spurious inference and demonstrates 
the steadiness of the results. 
5.1 Sensitivity to variables set 
Lu and White (2014) argue that researchers can test the structural validity by adding and 
removing regressors.  Initially we tested regression for redundant variables including all the 
insignificant factors from the Table 5 as redundant (results are shown in the Appendix Table 
A9). F-statistics equals to 0.15 implying that zero hypothesis about joint insignificance is not 
rejected. Hence, principal component, money supply, inflation and FDI are not value-adding 
in the regression.  
Secondly, we run new regressions changing the set of regressors. We run regressions with 
pairwise combinations of political risk and one of the control variables. Then, we include all 
the significant variables from the core specification as well as PC. The sensitivity of 
regression to the set of factors might be the sign of multicollinearity problem, 
misspecification, and lack of the economic base. Results are presented in the Table 7. 
Principal component is significant only in the second case, probably due to the bias in 
standard errors caused by omitting highly significant regressors D_GDP and D_U (columns 3 
and 4, Table 7). 
Regression seems to be quite stable in terms of coefficients signs and absolute values. 
Noteworthy, only IR and TR change the signs of coefficients turning to be in line with our 
assumptions and economic theory in restricted samples. The coefficient for PC reverses its 
  
36 
sign in the third regression; but the hypothesis about its zero-value is still not rejected. 
Adjusted R-squared grows in the last regression with all the explanatory variables included.  
Table 7: The sensitivity to set of variables 
The table below illustrates the estimation results with various sets of variables. The period 
fixed effects were used (LSDV estimator).  *, **, *** indicate significance on 10%, 5%, 1% 
level respectively. The dependent variable is R. Method of estimation: Panel Least Squares.  
White standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected).  
The number of observations: 662. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PC1 0.0054 0.0122*** -0.0034 0.0052 0.0089 0.0046 0.0010 
ER  -0.4654***     -0.3619** 
D_GDP   3.2012***    2.4807*** 
D_U    -6.1620***   -3.0678*** 
IR     -0.2326  0.3195** 
TR      0.0635 -0.1463 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4029 0.4264 0.4666 0.4358 0.4038 0.4023 0.4816 
 
 
To conclude, the “core” regression on returns shows the signs of structural validity since the 
results do not react enormously on inclusion or exclusion of separate variables demonstrating 
the steadiness of the main regression. We did not obtain the evidence that insignificance of 
political risk was caused by misspecification arising from the set of regressors. 
5.2 Regressions with WGI  
We control whether the regression results with principal component substantially differ from 
those for the WGI. If estimations resemble in terms of coefficients and their p-values, the 
principal component comprises an informative measure and the “core” regression is valid. 
The output is presented in the Table 8, and it can be clearly seen that columns do not 
considerably differ since coefficients are close to those for principal component.  Like in 
regressions with PC, GDP, exchange rate and unemployment are highly significant at 1% 
level, and their coefficients have economically interpretable signs. R-squared for LSDV 
estimator is around 50% in every specification, which is only little bit higher than in principal 
components specification.  
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Table 8: Regressions with WGI 
This table illustrates the estimation results using separate political risk measures. Indicators 
in regressions are the following: (1) Political Stability, (2) Regulatory Quality, (3) Voice and 
Accountability, (4) Control of Corruption, (5) Rule of Law, (6) Government Effectiveness. The 
number of observations: 662. Standard errors are in brackets.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance on 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Dependent variable: R. Method of 
estimation: Panel Least Squares. Effect specification: Period Fixed Effects (LSDV estimator). 
White standard errors & covariance (period, d.f. corrected) are used. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WGI 
0.0164 
[0.0135] 
 
0.0030 
[0.0189] 
0.0118 
[0.0169] 
0.0014 
[0.0144] 
0.0088 
[0.0158] 
0.0065 
[0.0167] 
INFL 
-0.4148 
[0.3710] 
 
-0.3967 
[0.3653] 
-0.4088 
[0.3655] 
-0.3949 
[0.3731] 
-0.4090 
[0.3673] 
-0.4058 
[0.3724] 
D_GDP 
2.2972*** 
[0.6663] 
 
2.3379*** 
[0.6876] 
2.2986*** 
[0.6867] 
2.3467*** 
[0.6790] 
2.3086*** 
[0.6738] 
2.3235*** 
[0.6797] 
D_U 
-3.0930*** 
[0.8836] 
 
-3.0439*** 
[0.8852] 
-3.0836*** 
[0.8987] 
-3.0393*** 
[0.8771] 
-3.0658*** 
[0.8837] 
-3.0706*** 
[0.8789] 
IR 
0.4638* 
[0.2720] 
 
0.5093* 
[0.2848] 
0.4929* 
[0.2806] 
0.5103* 
[0.2822] 
0.4978* 
[0.2788] 
0.5023* 
[0.2791] 
ER 
-0.3102*** 
[0.1115] 
 
-0.3010*** 
[0.1159] 
-0.3115*** 
[0.1130] 
-0.3090*** 
[0.1129] 
-0.3111*** 
[0.1126] 
-0.3098*** 
[0.1124] 
M2 
0.1639 
[0.1586] 
 
0.1722 
[0.1574] 
0.1670 
[0.1589] 
0.1735 
[0.1593] 
0.1654 
[0.1554] 
0.1687 
[0.1574] 
TR 
-0.1782** 
[0.0894] 
 
-0.1615* 
[0.0977] 
-0.1943* 
[0.1101] 
-0.1614 
[0.1041] 
-0.1747* 
[0.1021] 
-0.1670* 
[0.0935] 
FDI 
0.2505 
[0.1786] 
 
0.1967 
[0.1996] 
0.2297 
[0.1895] 
0.1880 
[0.1753] 
 
0.2150 
[0.1792] 
0.2028 
[0.1749] 
R-squared 0.5047 0.5038 0.5041 0.5038 0.5040 0.5039 
 
Again, the misspecification of the main estimations or incompetence of principal component 
cannot be documented. Returns are not sensitive to any dimension of political risk, measured 
by World Bank.  
5.3 Sensitivity to time span  
In order to check the sensitivity of our sample to time dimension we run the regressions on 
three time spans:  
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 2000-2013, since 1997-1999 is a period of Asian Financial crisis and default in 
Russia, which influenced many Post-Soviet countries from our sample. 
 2000-2007, since the financial conditions and macroeconomic policy substantially 
changed after financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
 2000-2007 and 2010-2013. We omit both the turbulences of the end of 20th century 
and the World Financial crisis impacting returns in 2008 and 2009.  
Period fixed effect capture some time-specific characteristics, but financial crises still 
constitute the outlying movements in the sample resulting, for instance, in reversed 
relationship between political risk and returns. Therefore, we suggest that PC can turn 
significant for the restricted samples.  
Table 9: Estimation on three time intervals  
The table presents regressions, which include three different periods: 2000-2013; 2000-2007, 
2010-2013. *, **, *** indicate significance on 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The 
dependent variable: R. Method of estimation: Panel Least Squares. Period Fixed Effects are 
used (LSDV estimator). White standard errors & covariance (period, d.f. corrected) are used. 
 2000-2013 2000-2007 2000-2007, 2010-2013 
PC1 0.0125 0.0186* 0.0130* 
D_GDP 1.9016*** 1.7401*** 0.4468** 
D_U 1.7169** -3.2729* -4.2066*** 
M2 0.2086 0.1246 0.3122*** 
FDI 0.1842 0.5620** 0.3005* 
INFL -0.2292 -0.5568 -0.3170 
ER -0.1337 -0.0895 -0.1141 
IR 0.0437 0.2878 0.0609 
TR -0.0704 -0.0870 0.0770 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5518 0.3765 0.4027 
No. of observations 546 312 468 
 
As can be seen from the Table 9, our hypothesis is valid. After removing outlying years, we 
obtained statistically significant coefficient for political risk, but only at 10% level (the 
second and the third columns). Although we decreased the sample size, the number of 
observations is large enough to obtain trustworthy results. Therefore, we conclude that results 
are quite sensitive to periods of financial turbulences and this influence is not fully captured 
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by period dummy variables from fixed effects specification. Moreover, the significance and 
absolute values of coefficients changed substantially sustaining our suggestions.  
5.4 The difference between country groups 
Prior studies in general claim the existence of distinction between developing and developed 
markets in terms of political risk and economic performance (for instance, Diamonte et al. 
(1996)). They argue that both returns and uncertainty measures are more volatile in 
establishing markets enhancing influence of political risk. This discrepancy is depicted in the 
Figure 2 from Chapter 4.1.2. Since fixed effects tests do not show significant cross-sectional 
heterogeneity, probably, due to large number of countries included, we specify the model to 
account for country groups. We introduce dummy variables taking the value 1 if the 
observation is related to developing country and 0 otherwise. In addition, we include the 
interaction term Dit*PCit, which accounts for differences in political risk measures. The 
regression specification becomes the following: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑_𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                               (7) 
In the equation above, the effect of political risk on returns for developing countries is 
captured by the sum (𝛾2+𝛽1), and consequently by 𝛽1 for developed countries. The estimation 
output is shown in the Table 10. Both the dummy variable and the interaction term are not 
statistically significant, thus, the difference between developed and developing countries is 
not observable for our dataset. New variables have not notably impacted the results: the same 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, unemployment and exchange rate obtain an 
explanatory power on returns. However, inflation turns to be highly significant with negative 
sign of the coefficient as expected. Interest rate still has a positive coefficient, which contrasts 
with most of prior studies and economic theory. We showed that INFL is negatively related to 
returns and significant at 5% level.  
Overall, adjusted for the number of factors R-squared does not increase substantially after 
adding new variables and now accounts for 48% of returns variation, suggesting that re-
specification does not significantly enhance the quality of estimations.  
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Table 10: The difference between developing and developed countries 
The table below presents the results from the regression, which accounts for differences 
between developed and developing countries. Standard errors are in brackets.  *, **, *** 
indicate significance on 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. The dependent variable: R. Method 
of estimation: Panel Least Squares. Period Fixed Effects are used (LSDV estimator). White 
diagonal standard errors & covariance (for periods, d.f. corrected). 
Number of observations: 662. 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
C 
-0.0371 
D_U 
-2.9449*** 
[0.0580] [1.1098] 
    
PC1 
-0.0110 
IR 
0.5352** 
[0.0172] [0.2271] 
    
D 
0.0318 
ER 
-0.3159*** 
[0.0577] [0.100038] 
    
D*PC 
0.0265 
M2 
0.1582 
[0.0206] [0.1175] 
    
INFL 
-0.4383** 
TR 
-0.1356 
[0.1849] [0.1251] 
    
D_GDP 
2.3138*** 
FDI 
0.2629 
[0.4505] [0.2838] 
Adjusted R- squared 
 
0.4844 
R-squared  0.5054 
 
Our findings are in the contrary with the most of previous studies, where the distinction 
between two groups of countries was mostly significant. However, our result might be in line 
with the predictions of Diamonte et al. (1996) who claimed that the gap between developed 
and developing countries related to political risk would narrow in the future. 
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6 Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to explore stock market performance with regard to political risk 
measures and macroeconomic indicators. After investigating previous studies, we found that a 
vast majority of them explore political risk influence within one or few countries and do not 
complement the research with macroeconomic factors. The current study fills this gap by 
increasing the sample size to 39 countries as well as applying additional explanatory 
variables. In total, we use eight macroeconomic indicators, which represent a country general 
performance, price level, international activities and monetary policy. The main limitation of 
the data is that both political risk measures and some macroeconomic indicators are available 
only on the yearly basis, while returns are usually investigated in shorter time horizons. 
However, the essence of political risk is long-term, which weakens the rigidity of this 
constraint.  
We adopted six indicators of political environment capturing such areas as violence, 
corruption, bureaucracy, freedom of speech, rules of law and regulatory quality. To combine 
all these areas, political risk was proxied by the principal component, which accounts for all 
the individual indicators.  Since our dataset captures both time and cross-sectional 
observations, panel methods were used to estimate the responses of returns, price-to-earnings 
ratios and dividend yields on the explanatory variables. A two-way fixed effects model was 
chosen for price-to-earnings ratios, period fixed effects were applied to returns and a fixed-
random effects combination was most suitable for dividend yields. In order to make valid 
inferences, we checked for multicollinearity as well as for heteroscedasticity and based the 
core specification on formal tests. 
Results show that political risk is a significant factor in explaining variations of price-to-
earnings ratios and dividend yields. The negative coefficient for price-to-earnings ratio is 
economically logical since, other things equal, investors are willing to pay less for the unit of 
firms’ earnings when facing more risk. The positive coefficient for dividend yields implies 
that political risk generally boosts dividend payments in relation to share price. However, no 
relation between returns and principal component as well as WGI was found, indicating that a 
political risk premium is wiped out, probably, due to the possibility to diversify portfolios.  
Moreover, among the macroeconomic factors, GDP, unemployment and exchange rate 
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appeared to be significant and have expected signs explaining returns. While total reserves 
and interest rates are statistically valid, the signs of coefficients contradict with our 
hypotheses.  
Additionally, we strengthened our conclusions with series of robustness checks. First of all, 
we tested if the estimation output for the principal component as a measure of risk did not 
differ from that of WGI. Secondly, we found that the results were sensitive to period 
dimension changes, since during crises the relationship between risk and returns became 
inversed. After removing some observations related to turbulences of 1997-1998 as well as 
the latest financial crisis in 2008-2009, the coefficient of political risk proxy turned significant 
at the 10% level. Finally, we investigated whether the influence of political risk varied 
significantly among groups of countries and we did not find evidence that developing 
countries were more subject to political factors than developed ones.   
Overall, our findings partially support previous research and theoretical frameworks. 
However, not all obtained coefficients were statistically significant and had the expected 
signs. The R-squared coefficient shows that there should be some other unobserved factors, 
which significantly explain stock market performance. The results obtained in relation to 
political risk influence on returns are similar to Beaulieu et al. (2005) and in contrast to 
Suleman (2013), Ramcharran (2003) and Erb et al. (1996).  
Considering prior papers as well as our own results, limitations and delimitations of the 
current study, several areas of further research can be carried out. First of all, higher 
frequency data can be applied since there is almost no research, which studies the combined 
effect of political risks and macroeconomic indicators. Secondly, there are few studies related 
to management’s decisions in relation to political risks, for instance, in case of dividend 
payments.  Therefore, moving from country-level data to companies specific variables might 
complement to existing research. Finally, due to data unavailability our sample lacks most 
recent developments reflecting current political circumstances. In particular, the influence of 
specific events such as the Ukraine crisis, sanctions related to Russia as well as Islamic State 
disturbances can be investigated further in future research.  
Summarizing, this study accomplishes our objectives and contributes to previous research. At 
the same time, it comes up with new research questions and unexamined areas, which should 
be scrutinized in details.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Previous Research 
The table presents the classification of prior empirical studies according to their purposes, 
approaches to model political risk and econometric methods. It reflects sample characteristics 
and the brief description of results. 
Authors Political risk 
proxy 
Methods Period, 
frequency, 
markets 
Results 
Firm level 
Beaulieu et al. 
(2005) 
 
Political news  GARCH 1990- 1996 
Monthly data 
Canada 
No effect on mean returns, positive 
influence on volatility.  
Girard, Omran 
(2007) 
ICRG Multifactor 
extension to 
CAPM 
(cross-section of 
stock returns) 
1997-2001 
Yearly data 
5 Arabic 
countries 
Model with both country and firm 
risk scores has better explanatory 
power. Risk positively affects 
returns.  
Durnev (2010)  
 
Elections Panel data 
methods 
1980- 2006 
Yearly data 
47808 firms, 
79 countries  
Elections decrease investment-to-
price sensitivity and this drop 
worsens post-election returns. 
Country level 
Events as a proxy of political risk 
Mei, Guo 
(2004) 
Elections 
 
Probit and 
switching 
regression 
analysis 
1994-1997 
Yearly data 
22 emerging 
countries 
Political risk has predictive power on 
financial crisis.  
Döpke, 
Pierdzioch 
(2004) 
Elections, 
surveys on 
politicians’ 
popularity. 
AR 
OLS 
VAR 
1960-2002 
Quarterly 
data 
Germany 
 
No evidence of political cycles, stock 
prices influence politics and not in 
reverse.  
Lin, Wang 
(2004) 
Dummies for 
legislative 
assemblies and 
power changes  
AR (3) 
EGARCH (1,1), 
GJR GARCH  
1984-2003 
Daily data 
Taiwan 
Market returns and volatility are not 
significant for the assembly effect, 
power changes are negatively related 
to mean returns and positively to 
volatility.   
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Soultanaeva 
(2008) 
Political news ARMA,  
Multivariate 
GJR GARCH 
2001-2007 
Monthly data  
Riga, Tallinn 
and Vilnius 
Political news decreases the volatility 
in Tallinn and Riga. There are 
spillovers effects among countries 
and with Russia.   
Indices as a proxy of political risk 
Diamonte, 
Liew, Stevens 
(1996) 
ICRG Portfolio 
approach 
1985-1995 
Quarterly data 
130 countries 
Political risk is more important 
determinant in emerging than 
developed markets.  
Erb, Harvey, 
Viskanta (1996) 
ICRG,  
CCR 
Time-series and 
cross-sectional 
regressions 
1979-1995 
Monthly data 
117 countries 
Positive influence of ICRG risk 
measures on returns.  
Perotti, Oijen,   
(2001) 
ICRG 
CCR  
 
Panel data 
methods 
 
 
1988-1995 
Semi-annual 
and monthly  
22 emerging 
countries  
Privatization increased political 
riskiness, while political risk is a 
priced factor in almost all 
regressions. Improvements in 
political risk increase stock returns.  
Ramchararran 
(2003) 
ICRG, 
Euromoney 
Panel data 
methods 
1992-1999 
Monthly data 
21 countries 
 
Political risk has significant positive 
impact on equity returns and on 
price-to-book ratio. Economic risk 
negatively affects dividend yield.  
Suleman (2013) ICRG GARCH, 
EGARCH (1,1) 
1984-2012 
Monthly data 
74 countries 
 
Political risk is priced in both 
emerging and developed markets, 
while the influence on emerging 
markets is higher. Positive impact on 
volatility. Decrease in political risk 
has positive effect on volatility.  
Cermeño, 
Suleman (2014) 
ICRG  Panel-GARCH 
process 
(asymmetric) 
1993-2013 
Monthly data 
Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru 
Positive influence on returns and 
volatility with significant leverage 
effect. 
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Table A2: Variable Description 
The table provides with the description and sources of all the variables used in estimations. It 
is divided into three parts; dependent variables, political risk measures, and control variables. 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variables 
R 𝑙𝑛(
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
) Logarithmic dollar returns based on local indices for each 
country.  
DataStream 
DY Dividend yield for each country based on local index DataStream 
P/E Price to earnings ratio for each country based on local index  DataStream 
Political risk measures 
Pol. Stab., Contr. 
of Corr., Gov. eff., 
Reg. Qual., Rule 
of Law, Voice and 
Acc. 
Proxies of political riskiness described in details in the section 2.2. 
Measurement: units of standard normal distribution ranging 
approximately from -2.5 to +2.5 increasing in level of risk.  
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
PC1, PC2, PC3 Three principal components for political risk indicators.   Our calculations 
Control variables 
D_GDP First differences of logarithmic GDP per capita in constant prices 
(2005 $ US). 
World Bank 
D_U Change in unemployment rate, the ratio to total labour force. World Bank 
INFL Inflation rate, annual change in consumer prices. World Bank 
ER Logarithmic change in the nominal exchange rate (Local currency 
units per $US), as proposed in ICRG database. An increase means 
depreciation of local currency. 
DataStream 
FDI Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments as a ratio to GDP (both 
in Local Currency Units). 
World Bank 
TR Total reserves (including gold) in current US$ in a ratio to GDP (in 
current US$). 
World Bank 
IR Deposit interest rate (yearly).  World Bank 
M2 Money supply (first difference of logarithms).  
Money and quasi money in local currency units. 
World Bank, 
DataStream 
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Table A3: Principal Component Analysis 
Panel A: The table below contains estimation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors for first three 
principal components. 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Eigenvalues 𝑥′?̂?𝑥 5.301 0.283 0.229 
Proportion of variance 
explained 
0.884 0.047 0.038 
 
   
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Eigenvectors 
 
 
0.384 0.677 -0.618 
0.419 -0.322 0.001 
0.420 -0.325 -0.145 
0.414 -0.203 0.111 
0.423 -0.225 -0.099 
0.388 0.491 0.758 
 
Panel B: The table below is the correlation matrix for PC and separate risk indicators. 
Probability POL. STAB.  
CONTR. OF 
CORR.  GOV. EFF.  
REG. 
QUAL.  
RULE OF 
LAW  
VOICE 
AND ACC.  
POL. STAB. 1.00 
     CONTR. OF CORR.  0.79 1.00 
    GOV. EFF. 0.81 0.96 1.00 
   REG. QUAL.  0.79 0.90 0.92 1.00 
  RULE OF LAW  0.83 0.95 0.96 0.92 1.00 
 VOICE AND ACC. 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.82 1.00 
PC1  0.88 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.89 
PC2  0.30 -0.24 -0.24 -0.17 -0.19 0.19 
PC3  -0.36 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 0.30 
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: The following table contains descriptive statistic of political risk measures. They are 
the following: (1) Political Stability; (2) Control of Corruption; (3) Government 
Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Quality; (5) Rule of Law; (6) Voice and Accountability. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) PC1 
 Mean -0.07 -0.42 -0.59 -0.58 -0.42 -0.46 -1.04 
 Median -0.19 -0.23 -0.55 -0.61 -0.39 -0.64 -0.93 
 Maximum 2.39 1.49 1.19 1.64 1.79 1.68 3.23 
 Minimum -1.67 -2.55 -2.36 -2.08 -2.00 -1.83 -4.71 
 Std. Dev. 0.89 1.00 0.84 0.81 0.93 0.85 2.05 
 Skewness 0.41 -0.47 -0.14 0.31 -0.01 0.47 -0.06 
 Kurtosis 2.13 2.16 2.09 2.33 1.93 2.14 1.86 
 Sum -44.98 -277.77 -387.57 -382.53 -277.85 -302.91 -689.80 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 519.77 666.40 470.20 438.77 569.08 482.84 2775.47 
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 
 
Panel B: The table below shows descriptive statistic of explanatory variables except political 
risk measures. 
 
INFL IR ER FDI D_GDP D_U M2 TR 
Mean 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.14 
Median 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.11 
Maximum 0.96 0.80 1.24 0.51 0.21 0.08 1.88 0.54 
Minimum -0.01 0.00 -0.33 -0.16 -0.16 -0.04 -0.42 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.11 
Skewness 5.18 4.77 2.97 4.78 -0.73 0.98 1.32 1.42 
Kurtosis 37.13 34.92 20.53 44.00 6.95 8.91 8.92 4.92 
Sum 41.86 45.45 19.09 22.35 15.88 0.12 81.43 89.94 
Sum Sq. Dev. 6.40 4.78 13.68 1.29 0.89 0.11 9.87 7.50 
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 
 
Panel C: The descriptive statistic of dependent variables is provided in table below. P/E 
multiple is shown before and after adjustments for outliers described in the Section 4.2 
 R DY P/E P/E before adj. 
Mean 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.17 
Median 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.15 
Maximum 1.31 0.35 0.78 6.18 
Minimum -1.78 0.00 -0.12 -1.74 
Std. Dev. 0.40 0.03 0.09 0.28 
Skewness -0.71 5.36 1.77 15.24 
Kurtosis 4.84 54.20 10.35 345.47 
Sum 41.40 19.89 106.84 112.09 
Sum Sq. Dev. 106.73 0.43 4.79 50.59 
Observations 662 662 658 663 
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Table A5: Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: The table below provides the check for multicollinearity. The highest values are 
highlighted. We do not find an evidence of multicollinearity problems in our set of the 
variables.  
 
INFL IR ER FDI D_GDP D_U M2 TR 
INFL 1.00 
  
     
IR 0.73 1.00       
ER 0.52 0.50 1.00      
FDI -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 1.00     
D_GDP -0.08 -0.13 -0.25 0.14 1.00    
D_U 0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.12 -0.55 1.00   
M2 0.42 0.40 0.20 -0.02 0.27 -0.18 1.00 
 TR -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.16 0.22 -0.03 0.10 1.00 
PC1 0.39 0.20 0.35 0.15 0.00 -0.19 0.35 0.26 
 
Panel B: The table below depicts the correlation between dependent and explanatory 
variables.  
 
R DY P/E 
PC1 0.02 0.08 -0.14 
INFL -0.07 0.07 -0.10 
IR -0.05 0.04 -0.10 
ER -0.21 0.12 -0.13 
FDI 0.09 -0.09 0.10 
D_GDP 0.50 -0.23 0.21 
D_U -0.35 0.09 -0.13 
M2 0.13 -0.02 -0.04 
TR 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 
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Table A6: Pooled regressions 
Returns regression P/E regression DY regression 
Dependent Variable: R   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 662  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.024709 0.034147 -0.723616 0.4696 
PC1 -0.001225 0.007935 -0.154395 0.8773 
M2 0.014201 0.132329 0.107319 0.9146 
D_GDP 4.672451 0.490510 9.525694 0.0000 
D_U -3.784545 1.274704 -2.968960 0.0031 
IR 0.510238 0.245343 2.079695 0.0379 
ER -0.339381 0.114912 -2.953400 0.0033 
TR -0.349959 0.137203 -2.550668 0.0110 
INFL -0.191463 0.213984 -0.894751 0.3713 
FDI 0.223460 0.320066 0.698169 0.4853 
     
     
R-squared 0.279183   
Adjusted R-squared 0.269233   
AIC 0.715741   
F-statistic 28.05877   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
   
   
     
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: P/E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 658  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.149247 0.008197 18.20730 0.0000 
PC1 -0.005684 0.001904 -2.985745 0.0029 
M2 -0.039385 0.031778 -1.239378 0.2157 
D_GDP 0.559266 0.117771 4.748747 0.0000 
D_U -0.034049 0.307491 -0.110732 0.9119 
IR 0.025203 0.058902 0.427874 0.6689 
ER -0.030285 0.027622 -1.096413 0.2733 
TR -0.041633 0.032897 -1.265562 0.2061 
INFL 0.007160 0.051293 0.139588 0.8890 
FDI 0.088647 0.076751 1.155005 0.2485 
     
     
R-squared 0.083202      
Adjusted R-squared 0.070469  
AIC -2.142021  
F-statistic 6.534195  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
   
   
     
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: DY   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 662  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.039864 0.002464 16.17561 0.0000 
PC1 0.001797 0.000573 3.138624 0.0018 
M2 0.003113 0.009550 0.325949 0.7446 
D_GDP -0.186535 0.035401 -5.269203 0.0000 
D_U -0.112216 0.091997 -1.219771 0.2230 
IR -0.028216 0.017707 -1.593525 0.1115 
ER 0.008956 0.008293 1.079883 0.2806 
TR -0.015305 0.009902 -1.545613 0.1227 
INFL 0.005839 0.015444 0.378054 0.7055 
FDI -0.013543 0.023100 -0.586265 0.5579 
     
     
R-squared 0.078807       
Adjusted R-squared 0.066092   
AIC -4.541675   
F-statistic 6.197579   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table A7: Fixed and Random Effects Tests 
 Returns regression P/E regression DY regression 
R
ed
u
n
d
an
t 
F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 T
es
t 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section F 0.850571 (38,598) 0.7248 
Cross-section Chi-square 34.847405 38 0.6160 
Period F 16.203818 (16,598) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 238.420476 16 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 5.889616 (54,598) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
square 282.322111 54 0.0000 
     
      
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section F 3.477529 (38,594) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 132.173708 38 0.0000 
Period F 2.581548 (16,594) 0.0007 
Period Chi-square 44.234394 16 0.0002 
Cross-Section/Period F 3.195372 (54,594) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
square 167.803623 54 0.0000 
     
     
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section F 4.972947 (38,598) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 181.786469 38 0.0000 
Period F 3.673805 (16,598) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 62.068920 16 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 4.675634 (54,598) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
square 233.166412 54 0.0000 
     
      
H
au
sm
an
 
T
es
t 
fo
r 
P
er
io
d
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Period random 29.275014 9 0.0006 
     
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Period random 21.369545 9 0.0111 
     
      
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Period random 33.565730 9 0.0001 
     
      
H
au
sm
an
 
T
es
t 
fo
r 
  
  
 
C
S
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
No heterogeneity in cross-sectional dimension. 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 39.166756 9 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
    
      
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 16.872442 9 0.0508 
     
      
 
  
55 
Table A8: Heteroscedasticity Tests 
Returns regression P/E regression DY regression 
Dependent Variable: RESID_R_SQ  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 662  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.082346 0.016215 5.078364 0.0000 
PC1 0.014123 0.003768 3.748115 0.0002 
D_GDP -0.070403 0.232926 -0.302253 0.7626 
D_U 0.571914 0.605312 0.944826 0.3451 
IR -0.504087 0.116505 -4.326757 0.0000 
ER 0.062312 0.054568 1.141919 0.2539 
INFL 0.759649 0.101614 7.475857 0.0000 
M2 0.111462 0.062838 1.773784 0.0766 
FDI -0.067495 0.151988 -0.444080 0.6571 
TR -0.096301 0.065153 -1.478089 0.1399 
     
     
R-squared 0.182870   
Adjusted R-squared 0.171591   
Akaike criterion -0.773711   
F-statistic 16.21275   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
    
     
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: RESID_SQ_PE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 658  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.005167 0.001541 3.353350 0.0008 
PC1 0.000438 0.000358 1.223033 0.2218 
D_GDP 0.005211 0.022140 0.235389 0.8140 
D_U -0.059974 0.057804 -1.037533 0.2999 
IR -0.018109 0.011073 -1.635463 0.1024 
ER -0.002752 0.005193 -0.530028 0.5963 
INFL 0.012596 0.009642 1.306315 0.1919 
M2 0.004335 0.005974 0.725720 0.4683 
FDI 0.013829 0.014428 0.958481 0.3382 
TR -0.001099 0.006184 -0.177783 0.8589 
     
     
R-squared 0.016367   
Adjusted R-squared 0.002705   
Akaike criterion -5.484782   
F-statistic 1.198010   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.293166   
    
     
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: RESID_SQ_DY  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1997 2013   
Periods included: 17   
Cross-sections included: 39   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 662  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.000547 0.000336 1.627004 0.1042 
PC1 8.81E-05 7.82E-05 1.127175 0.2601 
D_GDP -0.002198 0.004832 -0.454937 0.6493 
D_U -0.008340 0.012557 -0.664201 0.5068 
IR -0.000292 0.002417 -0.120889 0.9038 
ER 0.001704 0.001132 1.505363 0.1327 
INFL -0.000851 0.002108 -0.403825 0.6865 
M2 -0.000765 0.001304 -0.586576 0.5577 
FDI 0.004023 0.003153 1.275992 0.2024 
TR 5.23E-05 0.001352 0.038714 0.9691 
     
     
R-squared 0.009067   
Adjusted R-squared -0.004612   
Akaike criterion -8.524614   
F-statistic 0.662858   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.742877   
    
     
     
      
H0: rejected. Heteroscedasticity H0: not rejected. No heteroscedasticity H0: not rejected. No heteroscedasticity 
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Table A9: Test for redundant variables 
The table below contains the test for redundant variables, which is a joint significance test 
estimated by F-statistics and likelihood ratio. Both p-values imply that zero hypothesis should 
not be rejected and tested coefficients are considered jointly insignificant.  
 
Dependent variable: R 
Variables tested for redundancy: PC, M2, INFL, FDI 
 Value df Probability 
F-statistic 1.7163 (4, 653) 0.1446 
Likelihood ratio 6.9237 4 0.1400 
F-test summary: Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares 
Test SSR 0.5566 4  0.1391 
Restricted SSR 53.4928 657  0.0814 
Unrestricted SSR 52.9363 653  0.0811 
LR test summary:  Value df 
Restricted LogL  -106.6346 657 
Unrestricted LogL  -103.1728 653 
 
